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PROTECTING THE CORPORATE
EXECUTIVE: DIRECTOR AND OFFICER
LIABILITY INSURANCE REEVALUATED
MARTIN J. GREENBERG* and DAVID B. DEAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing maze of easily violated governmental regulation
in the areas of both securities and anti-trust laws, together with the
proliferation of third-party and stockholders' derivative suits, has
made it necessary for every professional business management
group to seek some means to afford itself sufficient protection
against the spiraling exposure to liability I In an effort to attract
and retain competent executives despite this increasing exposure,
many publicly held corporations are choosing to protect manage-
ment from the so-called "honest mistake" or "shakedown" stock-
holders' suits through the purchase of directors' and officers' liabil-
ity insurance. Although Lloyds of London has issued this type of
insurance for over twenty-five years, only within the last five to
seven years has corporate management seriously considered this
form of protection.2 To demonstrate the present magnitude of reli-
*B.S. 1967, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1971, Marquette University Law School; in
the law firm of Weiss, Steuer, Berzowski & Knger, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; member of the
Wisconsin Bar; Lecturer at Law, Marquette University Law School.
**A.B. 1972, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts; candidate for J.D.
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1. Rather descriptively noting the extent of exposure, one author wrote:
The directors and decision-making officers of such a corporation sit at the con-
trols of a gigantic engine of economic power. Misuse of those controls can bring the
engine into collision with whatever stands in its way--customers, competitors, em-
ployees, the public and the government. Such a collision can, by the same token,
inflict enormous damage upon the machine itself-a machine which does not belong
to the operators but to thousands or even millions of people who have little knowl-
edge of, and less control over, the manner of its operation. All these victims have
rights which they may vindicate in court. In short, the managers of a publicly held
company can hardly avoid exposing themselves to litigation and to liability which is
measured not in terms of the personal fortunes of the individual managers but
according to the vastly larger scale of the corporation's operations.
Bishop, New Cureforan Ol Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and Officers' Liability,
22 Bus. LAWYER 92, 92-93 (1966).
2. "One good measure of just how worried [corporate executives] are is that in the last
five years the amount of liability insurance sold to directors and officers has increased from
practically nothing to over I billion dollars." The Law: Trouble for the Top, FoRBEs, Sept.
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ance upon insurance in this area, Stewart, Smith Mid-America,
Inc. has reported that between 1963 and 1970, more than $2.5
billion of directors' and officers' liability insurance has been sold
through its offices to some seven hundred of the largest corpora-
tions in the United States. 3
The most obvious factor contributing to this increase in the
purchase of directors' and officers' liability insurance is the devel-
opment of what might be called an increased claims consciousness,
with a resultant increase in exposure to liability. Informal share-
holders' groups critical of corporate management have arisen at a
remarkable rate. While irate stockholders who denounce manage-
ment at annual meetings have been ever present in the business
world, some are now "telling it to the judge," rather than merely
attempting to convince fellow shareholders to vote objectionable
directors out of office. The result has been a dramatic increase in
the number of suits brought against directors and officers to re-
cover damages for real or fancied wrongs. This increasing volume
of claims and suits may also be attributable in part to the increase
in the number of stockholders. Persons holding publicly traded
corporate shares have increased from 6.5 million in 1952 to 31.9
million in 1970 - an increase of 390 percent in eighteen years.4
In Wisconsin alone, the number of individual shareholders between
1965 and 1970 had increased by 198,000, bringing the 1970 total
to 558,000 stockholders. This increase brought the percentage of
Wisconsin's population owning stock from 8.7 to 12.6 percent dur-
ing that period, 5 and these figures are ever increasing. It has been
estimated that the number of individual shareholders in the United
States will grow to nearly 50 million in 1980.
Another factor contributing to the increased reliance upon lia-
bility insurance is that the 1960's and early 1970's were periods of
business boom, evidenced by corporate expansion, diversification,
and acquisitions - ventures which usually involve the incurrence
of corporate indebtedness. In addition, many companies of ques-
tionable financial stability went public during the new issue mar-
kets of 1961-62 and 1967-68. When a boom collapses, commercial
1, 1968, at 23.
3. Stewart, Smith Mid-America, Inc. Brochure (1970). See The 1974 Wyatt Directors
and Officers Liability Survey at 15, analyzing the prevalence of D & 0 liability insurance.
4. Milwaukee Journal, March 22, 1971, § 2, at 15, col. 6.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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failures and bankruptcies run rampant, opening a fertile field for
stockholders' suits.' The 1974 Wyatt Directors and Officers Liabil-
ity Survey examines claim frequency as a function of corporate
profitability.' The more profitable companies are sued much less
than those encountering financial problems.
Corporate management's expanded exposure to financial risk
is also attributable, in part, to a growing trend on the part of courts
to construe with increasing strictness the role of management in the
modern publicly held business enterprise, whose characteristic sep-
aration of ownership and control departs from the traditional fac-
tual pattern in which fiduciary duties were defined. In most instan-
ces, a statutory standard of care describes the duty of the corporate
officer or director in terms of that "degree of diligence, care and
skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances in like positions." 9 While officers and directors may
be protected in some respect by this so-called "business judgment
rule,"' 0 recent court decisions have employed more stringent stan-
dards of care in relation to corporate acts of commission and
omission. Thus, although various causes of action have been filed
in the past," the future may well see the development of additional
7. Dunn & Bradstreet statistics indicate that there was an increase of commercial
failures and bankruptcies filed during the new issue markets of the 1960's. See 94
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 484-488 (1973).
8. The 1974 Wyatt Directors' and Officers' Liability Survey at 9 (hereinafter 1974
Wyatt Survey).
9. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891). See IDAHO CODE ANN . § 30-142 (1967);
LA. REV. STAT. § 12:36 (1969); MINN. STAT. § 301.31 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35
(1965). See also Adkins & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Directors,
20 Bus. LAWYER 811 (1965).
10. See Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912). See also H. HENN,
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 482-483 (2d ed. 1970); Note, The Continuing Viability of the
Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for Judicial Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562
(1967).
11. As examples of the most common charges relied upon in the past, see Otis & Co.
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946) (failure to obtain competitive bids where
required by prudent business practice); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1906) and
Trustees Mutual Bldg. Fund & Dollar Savings Bank v. Bosseiux, 3 F. 817 (E.D. Va. 1880)
(continual absence from directors' meetings, thereby allowing improper acts to be commit-
ted by others); Booth v. Dexter Steam Fire-Engine Co. No. 1, 118 Ala. 369, 24 So. 405
(1898) (failure to exercise reasonable care in selection of a depository bank which subse-
quently fails); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) (failure to
discover and prevent anti-trust violations); Black v. Parker Mfg. Co., 329 Mass. 105, 106
N.E.2d 544 (1952) (improvident expansion of corporate activities into new fields with
resultant losses); Helfman v. American Light & Traction Co., 121 N.J. Eq. 1, 187 A. 540
(1936) (improvident investment of corporate funds); Brown v. Watson, 285 App. Div. 587,
139 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1955) (issuance of stock without receipt of valid consideration).
1975]
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theories of liability aimed at officers and directors. Causes of ac-
tion grounded upon infringements of civil rights, tort claims for
pollution, expanding product liability, and failure to comply with
E.E.O.C., O.S.H.A., or Consumer Product Safey Act standards
represent just a few.
In addition to the changing interpretation of the due diligence
concept, many state statutes specify prohibitions which invoke
strict liability. In Wisconsin, for example, statutory liability is
imposed upon directors for unlawful dividend distribution, I2 pur-
chase of the corporation's own shares when its capital is im-
paired,13 loans to corporate officers until the time of repayment,14
and distribution of assets during liquidation without adequate pro-
vision for debts or obligations. 5
Perhaps the most serious concern is caused by the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which,
when coupled with vigorous administration by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and recent judicial interpretations, have
enlarged earlier concepts of directors' and officers' liability." In
particular, section 10(b) 7 of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5, Is promul-
gated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, have engen-
12. Wis. STAT. § 180.40(1)(a) (1973).
13. Id. § 180A0(1)(b).
14. Id. § 180.40(l)(d).
15. Id. § 180.40(1)(c).
16. Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. of Yale University warns of the risks and hazards
attributable to involvement in such action.
It must be admitted that no one today can accurately forecast the size of the risk
which is created by the prospect of increasingly vigorous enforcement of the federal
securities laws, both by the Securities and Exchange Commission and by private
litigants. That risk includes, of course, not only fines and amounts paid in satisfac-
tion of judgment or to compromise claims, but also legal expenses which are likely
to be high in this kind of litigation.
J. Bishop, Protecting Corporate Executives Against Liability and Expense under the Fed-
eral Securities Law, EMERGING FEDERAL SECURITIEs LAW: POTENTIAL LIABILITY 155-169
(Institute of Continuing Legal Education 1969).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971). This section prohibits use of "any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance" in the purchase or sale of securities.
18. 17 C.F.R. 334, § 240.10b-5 (1964). This regulation makes it unlawful for any person,
though the mails, interstate commerce, or any national securities exchange:
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
[Vol. 58
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dered a spectacular growth in the law relating to civil liability
arising out of securities transactions. As one court noted:
While other federal securities anti-fraud provisions are im-
portant, none have become as far-reaching as Rule lOb-5 which,
although used little in its early years, now represents approxi-
mately one-third of all current cases, public and private, brought
under the whole array of SEC statutes. It generates almost as
much litigation as all other anti-fraud provisions combined."9
The increase of litigation under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is
partially the result of the ease with which aggrieved individuals
may bring suit. Section 10(b) may be invoked as a basis for claims
only where the prerequisites to attachment of federal jurisdiction
have been met, that is, where there has been a use of the mails, of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of stock
exchange facilities. However, as one of these is apt to be present
in most securities transactions, it is difficult to escape from the rule
even in transactions which are purely intrastate.20
In addition, a plaintiff is afforded considerable substantive and
procedural advantages in bringing a suit based upon section 10(b).
Because this section provides for a federal cause of action, diversity
of citizenship is not necessary. Jurisdiction is conferred by section
27 of the Exchange Act of 1934, which gives to the district courts
of the United States exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the
rules and regulations of the Commission. Such suits may be
brought in any district in which any act or transaction constituting
the violation occurred, or in the district where the defendant is
found or transacts business. Process in such cases may be served
wherever the defendants may be found. Further, a shareholder
need not post security2' in a so-called derivative suit (wherein an
19. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
20. Many states have enacted laws, similar to the federal statute, prohibiting the em-
ployment of fraudulent practices in the sale and purchase of securities in intrastate transac-
tions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 28 (Supp. 1973); AIuz. Rev. STAT. tit. 44, § 44-1991
(1956); ARK. STAT. § 67-1235 (1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 125, § 1-1 (1963); IDAHO CODE
tit. 30, § 30-1403 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-866 (1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1253
(Supp. 1970); Ky. REv. STAT. § 292.320 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32(a), § 13 (1970);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.101 (1974); NEB. STAT. § 8-1102 (1970); NEV. REv. STAT. § 90.110
(1969); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-52 (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-29 (Supp. 1969);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 101 (Supp. 1970); ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.135 (1973); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-201 (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-2 (1969); Wis. STAT. § 551.41 (1973).
21. McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961) cert. denied 368 U.S.
939 (1961); Levine v. Bradlee, 248 F. Supp. 395 (E.D. Pa. 1965). State security-for-expense
1975]
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individual stockholder brings the action on his own behalf or on
behalf of a group of shareholders to enforce a corporate right). The
intent to defraud, an essential element in common law fraud, need
not be proven in private damage actions under rule lOb-5. 2  Fraud-
ulent motive need not be present. Knowledge itself may be suffi-
cient. Furthermore, under rule lOb-5, privity need not be present
between the plaintiff and defendant; that is, they need not both be
parties to the transaction or deal with each other. 23
Finally, the increase of litigation under section 10(b) may be
attributed to the breadth of coverage of such an action. Rule lOb-
5 makes it unlawful for "any person" to engage in the prohibited
act or omissions. Although referred to as an "insider" rule, it is
much broader in application than section 16(b) 24 of the Securities
an Exchange Act of 1934. Included are the corporation and its
directors, officers, and controlling stockholders.? In addition, the
rule covers persons who have access to material information which
is unavailable to the public 8 and persons to whom the material
information has been transmitted ("tippees").27
Despite the growing importance of rule lOb-5, it should not be
considered the only source of potential liability for corporate direc-
statutes, which generally cover derivative suits, are inapplicable to derivative claims under
lOb-5 because of the primacy of federal interest.
22. Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Wellington Computer
Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
23. New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970):
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. ...
25. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969); Baumen v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
26. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). See also A. BROMBERG, SECURMEs LAW: FRAUD SEC RULE 10B-5, § 12 (1967).
27. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
[Vol. 58
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tors. Recent cases have expanded directors' liability under section
11 of the Securities Act of 193321 for filing false registration state-
ments with the Securities Exchange Commission. For example, in
Escott v. Bar Chris Construction, Inc.,2 9 holders of debentures
issued by a corporation which was later adjudged bankrupt discov-
ered in the registration statement serious errors which had not been
detected by the underwriters, accountants, or outside directors. In
a subsequent bondholder's suit filed under section 11, the court
held that these defendants had not made a reasonable investigation
of the facts and, hence, were unable to satisfy the standard of due
diligence-a defense available to all parties to a security issuance
other than the issuer under section 11 (b) (3) of the Securities Act
of 1933. Thus, the court held all signatories to the registration
statement personally responsible for losses suffered, even though
they did not intentionally deceive the debenture holders.
In a subsequent case, Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.,as
the failure to disclose the loss of a programming contract in the
corporation's registration statement resulted in an award for actual
damages for which the directors and officers were personally liable.
The New York District Court (for the first time) also awarded
punitive damages to be satisfied out of the personal assets of the
president and underwriters of the stock. The Second Circuit, on
appeal, overruled the punitive damage award. Nevertheless, this
case represents an impressive example of the growing trend by the
courts to expand the personal exposure of those having fiduciary
obligations to shareholders.
Whatever the cause, this increase in exposure to personal liabil-
ity will undoubtedly result in some hesitancy on the part of pro-
spective directors to accept positions with corporations." Al-
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). This section imposes civil liabilities, on account of having
filed a false registration statement, upon every person who signed the registration statement,
every underwriter of such security, all directors or partners at the time of filing or named
in the statement as about to become such, and "every accountant, engineer, or appraiser,
or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him," where such
person has, with his consent, been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
statement or any report or valuation used in connection with the registration statement.
29. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
30. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
3 1. This result has already been reported:
While these and a scattered number of other directors are resigning, scores of
men are politely declining offers they once would have jumped at to serve on presti-
gious boards. The reason are many. Recent court decisions have broadened the duties
19751
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though being named a director is considered an honor, it entails
immense responsibility. In the minds of many, the burden is not
balanced by the small financial remuneration which usually ac-
companies the post.
II. PRESENT FORM OF PROTECTION - INDEMNIFICATION
At the present time, the most widely utilized method of shifting
the financial risk of liability. from the executive to the corporation
is through indemnification. Although there is no common law rule
entitling directors to reimbursement out of corporate funds, one
early Wisconsin decision accepted the proposition that a director
or officer would be entitled to have the corporation he served pay
the cost of defense of a lawsuit if he were successful." However,
in 1939, the New York court in New York Dry Dock v.
McCollom33 held that a corporation had no power to pay the
expenses of defending a derivative suit, even though the defendant
directors were vindicated on the merits. In the opinion of the court,
the directors were not entitled to reimbursement since they derived
their authority from the state, not from the corporation or its
shareholders. They were found not to be in the position of an agent
entitled to recovery for necessary expenses, but were rather sui
generis. Therefore, the corporation was not legally obligated to
reimburse them. In addition, there were no equitable considera-
tions, such as those of conserving some substantial corporate inter-
est or bringing some definite benefit to the corporation, which
would justify reimbursement or payment.
McCollom has been criticized by those who would argue that
indemnification is essentially part of the director's compensation
and that the real benefit to the corporation is the obtaining of the
directors' services. Agreeing with this argument, other courts have
rejected the McCollom rationale and have held that corporations
not only can, but should indemnify directors who prevail on the
and liabilities of a director. Stockholder suits, costly and time consuming to defend,
have been filed increasingly against directors. And as more companies expand into
wide-ranging fields, more and more men have to rule themselves out for board posts
because of conflicts of interest. The result: there is now a relative shortage of compe-
tent men willing and able to serve as directors.
Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1969 at 1.
32. The court allowed recovery for no other reason than "if no case is made against
defendants, it is not improper or unjust that the corporation should pay for the defense of
the action." Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 625, 109 N.W. 581, 592 (1907).
33. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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merits in derivative litigation.34 Thus, recognizing the problems of
corporate management in this area, one court indicated that the
purpose of indemnification was to encourage innocent directors to
resist unjust charges, to provide them an opportunity to hire com-
petent counsel, to induce responsible businessmen to accept the
post of director, and to discourage stockholders' litigation of the
strike variety.35
By far the most noticeable effect of McCollom was the subse-
guent proliferation of indemnification statutes, which have been
enacted in forty-eight states,3 the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Because these enactments vary in the
nature and extent of protection provided, and analysis of the par-
ticular statute involved must be made. In conducting such an anal-
ysis, consideration of the following questions should be useful in
determining the breadth of protection afforded:3 7
1. Exclusiveness.
a. Is the statutory provision exclusive?
b. If not, how can indemnification be provided in cases
not covered by the law?
1) By charter or by-law provision?
2) By resolution of the stockholders?
3) By resolution of the board of directors?
c. Can the statutory indemnification be narrowed?
1) How?
2) By whom?
2. Mandatory or Discretionary?
Is indemnification:
a. Mandatory?
34. In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207,45 N.W.2d 388 (1950); cf. Monney v. Willys-
Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888 (1953); Solimine v. Hallander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19
A.2d 344 (1941).
35. In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950). One author notes
that the principle of corporate indemnification has been defended:
on the ground that it would enable directors of limited means to enlist the services
of competent counsel on the assurance that if successful payment would be forthcom-
ing from the corporate treasury, it would also encourage men to accept the responsi-
bilities of the post of director, the emoluments of which would otherwise not be
commensurate with the risk of loss involved.
13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 6045.1, at 575 (1970).
36. Idaho and Illinois have no provisions authorizing indemnification of officers and
directors.
37. See W. CASEY, CORPORATE PLANNING § 62.313.1 (1971).
1975]
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b. Permissive or discretionary?
c. Mandatory in some cases and not in others?
3. Suits Covered.
Is indemnification available in:
a. Derivative actions (suits on behalf of the corpora-
tion)?
b. Third party actions?
c. Civil actions, criminal actions, or both?
d. Administrative or investigative proceedings?
e. Actions proceeding-wherein officers, directors, or
others appear in a role other than that of defendant?
f. Appeals?
g. Threatened litigation?
4. Costs and Expenses Covered.
a. All expenses actually and necessarily incurred?
b. Criminal fines?
c. Satisfaction of judgments?
d. Settlements?
e. Attorney fees?
f. Advancement of expenses?
5. "Persons" Covered.
a. Officers and/or Directors?
1) Present?
2) Former?
b. Others?
c. Heirs, executors, or administrators of "persons
covered"?
d. "Persons covered" serving in:
1) Foreign corporations?
2) Constituent corporations absorbed in merger or
consolidation?
3) Another corporation at the request of the corpo-
ration?
6. Standard of Care Required.
Indemnification will be allowed if the person:
a. Acted in good faith and reasonably believed his con-
duct to be within the scope of his authority?
b. Acted in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation?
c. Had no reason to believe his conduct to be unlawful?
d. Was not derelict in the performance of his duties?
[Vol. 58
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e. Was not adjudged liable for negligence or misconduct
in performance of his duties?
7. Determination of Whether Applicable Standard was Met.
Whether the required standard of care was met is to be
determined by:
a. The court?
b. The Board of Directors?
c. Independent legal counsel?
d. The shareholders?
In February, 1967, the Committee on Corporate Law of the
American Bar Association approved a new section of the Model
Business Corporation Act, dealing with indemnification of direc-
tors and officers. This provision represents an attempt to update,
clarify, and liberalize preexisting statutory indemnification in light
of modern-day conditions. Under the Model Act, as revised, a
corporation is empowered to indemnify a director or officer in-
volved in an action other than one by or in the right of the corpora-
tion against "expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines
and amounts paid in settlement," provided he acted in good
faith.38 Where liability results from a suit brought by or in the
right of the corporation, the corporation is empowered to indem-
nify the officer or director only for expenses (including attorneys'
fees); and if the director or officer has been adjudged liable for
negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties, he can
be indemnified only if, and to the extent that, the court adjudging
him liable determines that he is nevertheless entitled to indemn-
ity-and then, for only such expenses as the court deems proper. 9
However, if the director or officer was successful on the merits or
otherwise in defense of the action, he is entitled to indemnification
against expenses in any event." Where indemnification is condi-
tioned upon a finding that the director or officer acted in good
faith, such determination may be made by the board of directors,
the stockholders, or independent legal counsel.41 The Model Act
further contains provisions concerning entitlement to advance pay-
ment of expenses, 42 inurement of benefits to the director's or offi-
38. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 5(a) (1969).
39. Id. § 5(b).
40. Id. § 5(c).
41. Id. § 5(d).
42./a. § 5(e).
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cer's heirs,43 and empowerment of the corporation to purchase
insurance.41
Many states have already adopted provisions which are either
identical or comparable to the Model Business Corporation Act.
Wisconsin has such a statute 45 which incorporates into Wisconsin
law both the Model Act's indemnification provision and its provi-
sion granting authority to purchase insurance. Most states will
undoubtedly follow suit, resulting eventually in substantial uni-
formity in state indemnification provisions.
III. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR PURCHASE OF INSURANCE
Originally, expenditure of corporate funds for director's and
officers' liability insurance was said to be ultra vires because its
purchase was not for the benefit of the corporation. This contro-
versy however, was ended at least in those jurisdictions which legis-
latively empowered corporations to purchase and maintain liability
insurance for their management personnel. 48
The trend began with the 1967 amendments to the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act, which generally provided that any corpora-
tion could purchase insurance on behalf of a director, officer, em-
ployee, or agent against liability incurred by him in such capacity
or arising out of his status as such regardless of whether the
corporation could have indemnified him. 7 Later that same year,
Delaware added an almost indentical statutory authorization to its
43. Id. § 5(f).
44. Id. § 5(g).
45. Wis. STAT. § 180.05 (1973).
46. ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(64a)(g) (Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.010(g) (Supp.
1974); ARK. STAT. § 64-309(g) (Supp. 1973); CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(h) (West. Supp. 1974);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320a (f) (West. Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g)
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.13(17) (West. Supp. 1974); GA. STAT. ANN. § 22-717(g)
(1970); IA. CODE ANN. § 496A.4(19)(g) (West. Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305(g)
(1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.025(7) (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.83(F) (1969);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13A-719(7) (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 64(g) (1973); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (1970); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 450.1567 (1973);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.095(7) (1969); ANN. Mo. STAT. § 351.355(7) (West. Supp. 1974);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15)(g) (1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.75 (7) (1973); N.J. ANN. §
14A: 3-5(9) (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-19(c) (Supp. 1974); OHIO REv. CODE § § 1701.13(E)(3), 1702.12(E) (3) (Supp. 1974);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.43a(g) (West. Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. CODE § 57.260(4)
(1973); PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 1410(g) (West. Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7.1-1.4-1(g)
(1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-406 (Supp. 1974); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.02(16) (West
Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(0) (7) (1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-3.1(g) (1973);
WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.025 (7) (West. Supp. 1975).
47. ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 5(g) (1969).
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corporate indemnification statute," which has served as a national
prototype.49 Unlike the authors of the Model Act, however, Dela-
ware saw fit to further extend insurance coverage to personnel of
constituent corporations absorbed in a consolidation or merger.50
Rather than directly provide that a corporation may purchase
liability insurance for its management personnel, the Ohio legisla-
ture chose to place in its indemnification statute a provision to the
effect that indemnification is not to be deemed exclusive of other
rights to which a director or officer may be entitled under insur-
ance purchased by the corporation.5 ' Thus it appears that, although
the statute does not expressly dictate, a corporation may purchase
insurance for the indemnification of its officers and directors; the
power may be inferred under the broad general powers conferred
by the law of the state and the non-exclusive provision. Such power
is subject to modification through articles of incorporation, corpo-
rate by-laws, or an agreement or vote of the shareholders.
Most restrictive of all the present statutes in this area is that
of New York. Under the law of that state, a corporation may
purchase insurance in three instances only:
(1) To indemnify the corporation for any obligation which it
incurs as a result of the indemnification of directors and officers
(2) To indemnify directors and officers in instances in which
they may be indemnified by the corporation. . . . and
(3) To indemnify directors and officers in instances in which
they may not otherwise be indemnified by the corporation...
provided the contract of insurance covering such directors and
officers provides, in a manner acceptable to the superintendent
of insurance, for a retention amount and for co-insurance. 2
In addition, no insurance may provide for any payment, other than
that for defense costs, on behalf of any director or officer if (1) a
final adjudication established that the director or officer engaged
in deliberately dishonest acts which were material to the cause of
action or that he personally gained an advantage to which he was
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (Supp. 1968).
49. Delware's reason for enacting such a statute was that it would remove any doubt
as to the power to carry insurance and to maintain it on behalf of directors, officers,
employees and agents.
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145(h) (Supp. 1974).
51. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(7) (1973).
52. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727(b)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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not legally entitled; 5 or (2) the loss resulted from a risk, the
insurance of which was prohibited under the state insurance laws. 4
Further, to be covered, the act of the officer or director must have
occurred after the purchase of the policy.55 Finally, the New York
statute requires notice and disclosure to stockholders of informa-
tion concerning the insurance. 6
By way of contrast, the California statute is permissive. Corpo-
rations are free to purchase insurance on behalf of any officer,
director, or employee of the corporation or of a subsidiary against
liability resulting from misfeasance or nonfeasance, be it actual or
only alleged.57
The power to purchase insurance extends not only to business
corporations, but also to financial institutions such as savings and
loan associations and national banks.58
IV. THE UNDERWRITING PROCESS
A. Selection of Risks
Although Lloyds of London has been the forerunner in the field
of providing insurance protection for directors and officers,59 many
companies offer such coverage today." Despite the growing num-
53. Id. § 727(b)(1).
54. Id. § 727(b)(2).
55. Id. § 727(c).
56. Section 726(e) of the New York Statutes provides for notice to shareholders when
direct indemnification payments are made by the corportion. Section 727(d) requires a
corporation purchasing or renewing an indemnification insurance policy to notify the share-
holders as to the name of the carrier, the date of the contract, and the corporate positions
insured. Further, the corporation must furnish a statement explaining all sums paid under
any indemnification policy. It should be noted that under this statute the amount of cover-
age need not be disclosed, as such knowledge might unfairly affect the position of an insurer
in the defense of a claim against an insured director or officer. Time limitations for provid-
ing this information are established as being no later than the next annual meeting of
shareholders, unless the meeting is within three months from the date of such payment, but,
in any event, within fifteen months from the date of payment.
57. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 830(h) (West. Supp. 1974).
58. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.25(c) (1971).
59. W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 17.01 at 429
(2d ed. 1973).
60. Companies offering such coverage include American Home Assurance Company,
New York, New York; American States Insurance Company, Indianapolis, Indiana; Conti-
nental Insurance Company, New York, New York; Employers Insurance of Wausau, Wau-
sau, Wisconsin; Kemper Insurance Company, Chicago, Illinois; Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, Boston, Massachusetts; and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, St.
Paul, Minnesota. See W. KNEPPER, supra note 59, § 17.05 at 435-436 n. 25 (1973); T.
SHEEHAN, THE LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS: WITH PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
FOR THEIR DISCHARGE 17 (1970).
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ber of insurers presently in the field, however, there are only two
significantly different types of forms: one used by the London
insurers written as a two-part form - the first part being a corpo-
rate reimbursement contract and the second part being the actual
D & 0 contract, both being issued on the basis of a single applica-
tion for a single premium and constituting a single transaction; the
second type is a one part form used by St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company and Stewart, Smith Mid-America (written by
CNA) which combines the coverages. 1
An application for directors' and officers' coverage usually
consists of a notarized statement, which ultimately becomes part
of the policy, if any is in fact issued. Normally, the applicant must
provide the following information:
1. The length of time the applying company has been in busi-
ness;
2. The date on which the company began to pay cash divi-
dends on common and preferred stock on a continuous basis;
3. The number of common shares outstanding; the number of
common shareholders, the number of common shares owned by
directors directly or beneficially, and the number of common
shares owned by officers who are not directors;
4. The total number of wholly owned subsidiaries and the
total number of controlled subsidiaries;
5. Whether there is any claim outstanding or pending against
any person proposed for insurance in the capacity of officer or
director;
6. Whether similar insurance on behalf of the company has
ever been declined, canceled, unrenewed, or refused;
7. Whether any person proposed for directors' and officers'
insurance is cognizant of any error, act, or omission which he has
reason to suppose might afford valid grounds for any future claim
such as would fall within the scope of the proposed insurance;
8. Whether the company and/or its directors and officers
have been involved in or have any knowledge of any anti-trust, tax,
or copyright litigation or any governmental regulatory or adminis-
trative proceedings;
9. Whether the company at the present time contemplates
any acquisitions, tender offers, or mergers; and
10. Whether the company filed with the Securities and Ex-
61. W. KNEPPER, note 59 supra, § 17.05 at 435-436.
1975]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
change Commission within the past eighteen months or contem-
plates filing within the next twelve months any registration state-
ment for a public offering of securities.62 The application form,
which must be signed and declared as containing true statements
by either the chairman of the board or the president, thereafter
forms the basis of the contract and will be attached to and become
part of the policy itself.
In addition to a completed application form, most insurers
require a copy of the latest annual report to stockholders providing
operating figures for the past five years or, in the alternative, an
audited financial statement. In addition,a copy of any indemnifica-
tion agreement as contained in the corporate charter or by-laws, a
copy of notice of stockholders' meeting and proxy request for
either the last or next annual meeting, and a current Dunn and
Bradstreet analytical report must be forwarded to the insurer.63
All this information, and any information gathered by the un-
derwriter in his own investigation, enter into the evaluation of the
risk's acceptability. The most critical of factors in determining
suitability include the company's stability in growth (as opposed
to wide fluctuations in earnings), previous involvement in lawsuits,
susceptibility to mergers, profitability, size and type of operations,
and market served." Companies whose business makes them spe-
cifically subject to patent infringement suits or companies largely
dependent upon a single customer may have difficulties in obtain-
ing coverage. In an even worse position are "close corporations,"
which at this time are probably unacceptable for ordinary direc-
tors' and officers' insurance. 5 Other corporations, such as those
which do substantial business in government contracts, those in the
electronics field, those which have completed a number of mergers
in the past five years, and those which are newly formed are care-
fully scrutinized before accepted. 6
As can be seen, underwriters exercise considerable selectivity
in accepting risks. It has been estimated that of every one hundred
62. Stewart, Smith Mid-America, Inc., Form SS-4 (hereinafter cited as Stewart, Smith
Form).
63. Form letter from Paul W. Suit, Vice-President, Stewart, Smith, Mid-America, Inc.,
March 8, 1971.
64. MACHINERY & ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABIL-
ITY INSURANCE 11 (1969).
65. Id.
66. MONTHLY POLICY & MANUAL ANALYSIS: DIRECTORS' AND OFFCERS' LIABILITY
INSURANCE § 273.26 (1968).
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applicants, no more than twenty-five companies are finally success-
ful in acquiring directors'-and officers' liability insurance. Of all
applicants, it has been further estimated that fifty percent are elim-
inated by underwriters and that twenty-five percent eliminate
themselves either because the premium is too high, the coverage is
considered inadequate, the policy limit desired is unobtainable, or
the deductible offered is too high or too low."7
B. Types of Policies Offered
Presently available are two basic types of policies, based on the
size of the insured corporation. Late in 1969, the American States
Insurance Company introduced what it called a "mini" directors'
and officers' policy designed for small commercial, financial, and
industrial risks - to be more specific, for financial institutions
with assets of $40 million or less and for modest-sized nonfinancial
corporations with assets of not more than $10 million nor less than
$5 million.6" Since that time, other insurers have made available
similar programs, with varying size limitations. 9 In most cases, the
minimum retention" under the "mini" policy is $5,000. Although
not ordinarily required in a "mini-program," coinsurance with five
percent participation by the insured may be necessary. As a general
rule, all risks must be in business at least five years with a profit
history and a record of dividend payments. 7' Despite these factors
however, the "mini" program has opened the liability insurance
field to certain closely held corporations. 72
The other type of policy available is that offered to the larger
firms under what has come to be known as the "maxi program."
67. MACHINERY & ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, supra note 64; See also The 1974
Wyatt Directors' and Officers' Liability Survey at 16.
68. BusINESS INSURANCE, Dec. 8, 1969 at 53.
69. American Home Insurance Company writes a similar "mini" policy. See BUSINESS
INSURANCE, Jan. 19, 1970, at 58. Wholreich & Anderson, Ltd. markets a policy of like type
especially designed for savings and loan associations. Stewart, Smith makes its "mini"
program available to financial institutions with deposits of not less than $10 million nor
more than $100 million and to corporations with assets not over $7.5 million and a net worth
of at least $I million, and to nonprofit organizations having assets not over $100 million. A
customary maximum coverage of $1 million is written in this "mini" program, although
quotations will be offered for $2 million and $3 million upon request.
70. Retention or "deductible" is an amount deducted from a loss and paid by the
insured before the insurer is required to pay.
71. Form letter, supra note 63.
72. Mr. Suit indicates that even country clubs, colleges and universities, Blue Cross-
Blue Shield plans and hospitals are now underwritten.
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Qualification under this plan, to quote a standard response given
by one of the insurers in this field, requires that a corporation be
a:
publicly owned company that has a steady history of earnings
with $5,000,000 or more in assets, $10,000,000 or more in sales,
and has been in business at least five years. There must also be
continuity of management, a low, long term indebtedness ratio
compared to capitalization, and an absence of current litiga-
tion . 3
As a general rule, any financial institution with deposits of $100
million or more will qualify.
Unlike the "mini" program, the "maxi" policy is individually
underwritten and rated by all insurers, quotations usually remain-
ing in force for three years. As a general rule, a minimum retention
(i.e. deductible) of $20,000 is required, although in some cases the
deductible may be varied on the basis of underwriting judgment
and increased to $100,000 or more. Higher corporate retentions
might be applied, with corresponding policy discounts, to risks
which are subject to considerable litigation, such as conglomerates,
real estate holding and development corporations, and companies
susceptible to antitrust charges. The retention prevents an inordi-
nate increase in a premium by eliminating the insurer's responsibil-
ity for the smaller and more frequent claims. Consistent also with
considerations of public policy, it serves as a costly deterrent to
executive carelessness or misconduct.
In addition to the retention provision, the policy usually pro-
vides for participation in, or coinsurance of, covered risks. For
example, the Lloyds' policy form obliges the underwriters to pay
ninety-five percent of the loss in excess of the amount of the reten-
tion, up to the limit of liability. The remaining five percent of each
and every loss is to be absorbed by the assureds at their own risk.
The purpose of participation in the loss is to provide both an
additional deterrent to negligence or misbehavior and an added
incentive for vigorous defense against questionable or unfounded
claims. This five percent participation, when combined with the
retention provision, could have significant financial impact on
directors and officers in a large claim, notwithstanding the exist-
ence of coverage.
Further restricting the amount of actual protection officers'
73. Form letter, supra note 63.
[Vol. 58
EXECUTIVE LIABILITY
and directors' insurance can afford is the policy limit. Although a
minimum limit of $1 million is usually imposed, that figure hardly
represents the amount actually sought by the larger corporations.
In the early days of its development, this type of insurance was
most commonly issued in a range of coverage between $3 million
and $5 million. Today, corporate directors have come to the reali-
zation that the limits of insurance should be large enough to cover
the entire potential exposure, if such coverage is obtainable. Thus,
it is no longer uncommon to find a policy limit of $50 million. As
might be expected, the amount of coverage purchased tends to vary
directly with the size of the company.
Recent developments have occasioned new offerings which pro-
vide coverage specifically aimed at the needs of particular business
groups. Policies tailored specifically for financial institutions, sav-
ings and loan associations, association executives, trustees of pen-
sion and welfare funds, condominium and co-operative boards,
nonprofit and charitable organizations, and a new "Maximan"
policy covering directors and officers only for a reduced rate are
now available.15
C. Cost of Coverage
Directors' and officers' liability policies are usually written on
a three-year basis, the premium being payable either in advance or
in annual installments at an increased rate, usually from eleven to
twenty percent of the total premium.7 6 Although the premium for
74. Hatzel, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, THE NATIONAL INSURANCE
BUYER, Jan., 1965, at 24. To illustrate changes in policy limits, one study conducted by the
Machinery & Allied Institute indicated that of fifty-one firms represented, thirty-six pur-
chased directors' and officers' insurance. Among these thirty-six, the amount of coverage
ranged from $1 million to slightly over $20 million. Twenty-one of the thirty-six companies
(or sixty percent) carried $5 million or less; ten companies (or twenty-nine percent) carried
$10 million; one company (or three percent) carried $15 million; and three companies (or
eight percent) carried $20 million or more in insurance coverage. The 1974 Wyatt study
indicates that of the 1,321 participants, 763 (57.8%) carried D & 0 insurance. The average
limit for 1974 was $7,071,000, with approximately ten percent of all those companies carry-
ing insurance insuring with limits of $15 million or more. The highest limit carried on a
pure D & 0 form was $50 million (two companies); and one company reported a total limit
of coverage in excess of $100 million, as a combination of primary D & 0 with excess and
umbrella coverage. (See the 1974 Wyatt report at page 18 with accompanying tables).
75. W. KNEPPER, NOTE 59 supra, § 17.05 at 100-106 (2d ed. 1974 Supp.); see also
Knepper, Officers and Directors: Indemnification and Liability Insurance-An Update, 30
Bus. LAWYER 951, 963-66 (1975).
76. W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, § 10.04 (1st ed.
1969).
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this coverage is high, whether it is "too high" is a question that
can only be answered by individual experience. There is no "book"
on this risk - no body of actuarially proven loss experience from
which a schedule of premiums can be derived - and, hence, there
is no standard premium. Consequently, each applicant is individu-
ally underwritten and premium rated. In general, the premium will
depend upon such factors as the size of the company, the number
and size of subsidiaries, the type of industry, the deductible ac-
cepted, the total policy limit, the governing state corporation stat-
ute, the indemnification agreement subsisting between the corpora-
tion and its directors and officers, the company's labor practices
and history, the stability and experience of management, the extent
of public ownership, and the firm's susceptibility to merger or
other combination.7
As previously indicated, the cost of coverage is subject to ex-
treme variations. In 1966, it was reported that a premium of
$15,000 to $50,000 might be charged for a three-year policy with a
limit of $5 million. 78 During the period between 1965 and early
1969, premium rates approximately tripled.79 In early 1970, one
source stated that three-year premiums on "maxi" policies began
at $12,500 for a $1 million policy and increased $2,500 for each
additional $1 million coverage." It should be noted, however, that
these figures are described as minimum rates and may not exem-
plify what the policies would actually cost after individual under-
writing and rating.
With reference to the cost of coverage, one representative of a
leading broker has commented:
In fact it [D&O coverage] is the most expensive single insurance,
other than group and workman's compensation, that most corpo-
rations have. But the risks are high also. Underwriters are not
reaching for D&O business."'
Payment of the premium is usually shared by management and
the corporation, the ration (usually set rather arbitrarily and gener-
77. MACHINERY & ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 12; The 1974 Wyatt
Directors' and Officers' Liability Survey at 23.
78. A Shield Against Stockholders Suits, BUSINESS WEEK, July 2, 1966, at 57.
79. Knepper, Let the Director Beware, 37 INs. COUNSEL J. 27, 34 (1970).
80. T. SHEEHAN, THE LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS: WITH PRACTICAL
SOLUTIONS FOR THEIR DISCHARGE 18 (1970).
81. Stanley I. Wallace, of Johnson & Higgins, New York, PROTECTING THE CORPO-
RATE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR FROm LIBILITY-2D, Practicing Law Institute publication No.
B4-2586 at 122 (1971).
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ally controlled by local law) ranging from 10:90 to as high 50:50.2
Recently, some states have enacted statutes which would empower
a corporation to pay the entire premium.1 Where such a statute
is present, the by-laws or charter might prove to be the only obsta-
cle to a company's payment of the entire amount.
Questions often arise as to whether premium payments made
by the corporation are deductible and whether directors or officers
must in their returns include as income the amount paid by the
corporation to the insurer. In a relatively recent ruling," the Inter-
nal Revenue Service declared that a corporation may deduct, as
an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code, premiums paid by the firm for
insurance policies indemnifying the corporation against damages
for the wrongful acts of its officers and directors in their official
capacity and reimbursing the latter for their expenses arising from
such wrongful acts. Further, the IRS indicated that the premiums
paid by the corporation would not be includable as "income" but,
would rather be considered "noncompensatory fringe benefits"
-payments made by the corporation in fulfillment of an obliga-
tion incurred in obtaining the services of its officers and directors.15
Viewed in this manner the premiums can be said to be connected
with the corporation's business and, hence, "ordinary and neces-
sary." Remaining unanswered, however, is the question of how the
Internal Revenue Service will treat amounts received by officers
and directors as reimbursement for legal expenses incurred when
suit is brought as a result of a business decision.
V. A LOOK AT THE POLICY: STEWARD, SMITH FORMS SS-4
For purposes of analysis, the CNA form utilized by Steward,
Smith as Form SS-4 (Directors' and Officers' Liability Including
Company Reimbursement Policy) will be examined. It should be
noted at the outset that the Steward, Smith policy is written on a
bi-policy format. The corporate reimbursement portion actually
reimburses the corporation for payment made to its directors and
82. See Brook, Officers' and Directors' Liability Insurance, FORUM, July, 1967, at 228;
Anderson, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 47 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 31, 32
(1965).
83. For example, CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(h) (West 1955), permits a corporation to pay
the premium for indemnity insurance.
84. Rev. Rul. 69-491, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 22.
85. Id.
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officers under an indemnification agreement. The Directors' and
Officers' Liability portion insures directors and officers against
liabilities not covered by corporate indemnification.
A. Definitions
As is essential in any discussion utilizing terms of art, the
groundwork for assuring common understanding must first be laid.
Hence, this section on definitions - paralleling the third section
in the insurance policy itself.
"Directors and officers" are generally defined as persons who
were, now are, or shall be directors and/or officers of the company
including estates, heirs, and legal representatives or assigns of
directors and/or officers in the event of their death, incompetency,
insolvency or bankruptcy. Also included within this definition are
directors and officers of any subsidiaries acquired or created after
the inception of the policy, subject, again, to written notice and the
exaction of an additional premium. 81
"Loss" as used in the policy means any amount the directors
and officers are legally obligated to pay and for which they are not
indemnified as a result of claims made against them for "wrongful
acts," including (but not limited to) amounts paid for damages,
judgments, settlements with costs, attachment or similar bonds,
and investigation and defense of legal actions, claims or preceed-
ings and appeals therefrom. 7 In light of its use of the term "wrong-
ful acts," this definition, itself, requires further explanation. A
"wrongful act" within the meaning of the loss provision is defined
as:
...any actual or alleged error or misstatement or misleading
statement or act or omission or neglect or breach of duty by the
Directors or Officers in the discharge of their duties individually
or collectively or any other matter not excluded by the terms and
conditions of this policy claimed against them solely by reason
of their being Directors or Officers of the Company.
Prior to leaving the definition of "loss," it should be noted that this
term does not include fines or penalties imposed by law and mat-
ters which may be deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to
which the policy is to be construed. 9
86. Stewart, Smith Form SS-4 11 11(b).
87. Id. 111(d).
88. Id. 11 II(c).
89. Id. 1 111(d).
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The last term which should be defined is "policy year," which
means either "the period of one year following the effective date
and hour of this policy or any anniversary thereof" or, if the period
between the effective date or anniversary and the date of termina-
tion of the policy is less than one year, then such lesser period."
B. Insuring Clause
Although the language of the insuring clause may vary in dif-
ferent policies, in substance all provide that if, during the policy
period, any claim is made -against the insureds (officers and direc-
tors or company as defined) for any wrongful conduct while acting
in their capacities as directors or officers, the insurance company
will pay, on behalf of the insureds, their executors, administrators,
and assigns, all loss which the insureds shall become legally obli-
gated to pay, in excess of the retention stated in the declarations
of the policy and up to the limit of liability except for such loss
which the company shall indemnify such directors and officers."
C. Exclusions
Excluded from coverage in the directors and officers policy are
losses resulting from certain types of conduct. Most commonly
excluded by this provision are losses resulting from:
1. A claim of libel or slander;"
2. An action arising from charges of seepage, pollution or
contamination and based upon or attributed to violation of any
federal, state, municipal or other governmental statute, regulation
or ordinance prohibiting or providing for the control or regulation
of emissions or effluents of any kind into the atmosphere or any
body of land, water, waterway or watercourse or arising from any
action or proceeding brought for enforcement purposes by any
public official, agency, commission, board of pollution control
administration pursuant to any such statutes, regulations or ordi-
nances or arising from any suits alleging seepage, pollution or
contamination based upon common law nuisance or trespass. 3
3. A claim based upon any insured's gaining in fact any per-
sonal profit or advantage to which he was not legally entitled;94
90. Id. 1 111(0.
91. Id. 1 I.
92. Id. 9 IV(b)(1)
93. Id. IV(a)(4).
94. Id. IV(b)(2).
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4. An action for the return by those insured of any remunera-
tion paid to them without the previous approval of the stockholders
of the corporation, provided that such payment has been held by
the courts to have been illegal. 5
5. An action for an accounting of profits made from the pur-
chase or sale by those insured of securities of the corporation
within the meaning of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and amendments thereto or similar provision of any state
statutory or common law;96
6. A claim brought about by the dishonesty of those insured;
however, notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that
this exclusion does not apply unless a judgment or other final
adjudication adverse to those insured establishes that acts of active
and deliberate dishonesty committed by them with actual dishonest
intent were material to the cause of action so adjudicated;97 and
7. A claim for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of any
person, or for damage to or destruction of any tangible property,
including loss of use thereof. 8
Also excluded is any loss which is insured by any other existing
valid policy or policies, where payment of the loss is actually made
by the other insurer or insurers, with the exception that should
there be any excess beyond the amount of payments under such
other policy or policies, the directors' and officers' policy will
cover.9" Similarly excluded are losses for which those insured are
to be indemnified by the corporation, pursuant to the statutory and
common law or the charter or by-laws of the corporation. 10 Fi-
nally, also excluded are losses for which the insureds are entitled
to indemnity or payment by reason of their having given notice of
any circumstance which might give rise to a claim under any other
policy or policies, the term of which expired prior to the issuance
of the directors' and officers' policy.'"'
D. Deductibles - Retention and Coinsurance Provisions
As discussed earlier, the policy also contains a retention and
95. Id. IV(b)(3).
96. Id. 1 IV(b)(4).
97. Id. IV(b)(5).
98. Id. IV(a)(3).
99. Id. IV(a)(l).
100. Id. 1(a).
101. Id. IV(a)(2).
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coinsurance clause, wherein the insurer assumes liability for but
ninety-five percent of the loss in excess of the amount of retention
up to the policy limit.'0 2 Thus, for example, should X Corporation
purchase a directors' and officers' liability policy with a $40,000
retention and a $1 million limit, and should its directors become
liable for a $240,000 claim, the insurer would cover only ninety-five
percent of the amount of the claim in excess of $40,000 - in other
words, ninety-five percent of $200,000 (or a total of $190,000). The
remaining $50,000 loss would have to be borne by the directors,
without benefit of any insurance. Of this $50,000, $40,000 would
represent the retention, and $10,000 would represent the coinsur-
ance feature (five percent participation in the $200,000 excess over
the retention). Should multiple losses result from the same act or
from interrelated acts of one or more of the insureds, only one
retention is deducted, as such losses are considered for insurance
purposes to constitute but a single loss.'0 3
E. Costs, Charge, and Expenses
Under the policy, no costs, charges, and expenses may be in-
curred without the insurer's consent, which in turn is not to be
unreasonably withheld.' 4 If consent is given, the underwriter is to
pay ninety-five percent of all such costs, subject to the same limita-
tions contained in the limits of liability section of the policy.'0 5 It
should be noted that the insurer's payment of costs, charges, and
expenses is intended to limit its liability to. the policy limit other-
wise applicable under the policy.' In other words, these charges
are subject to the payment of the retention by the insured, and are
paid only to the extent they do not exceed the policy limits.'
7
As is evident, these clauses are rather confusing and, thus, can
best be understood by referring to a hypothetical situation. Assume
that X Corporation has purchased a directors' and officers' policy
with a $20,000 retention and a $500,000 liability limit. If, to dispose
of a claim, the defendant must pay $480,000 plus costs in the
amount of $90,000, under the policy, the insurance company would
pay ninety-five percent of $460,000 (or $437,000) plus ninety-five
102. Id. V(a).
103. Id. V(c).
104. Id. VI.
105. Id. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
106. W. KNEPPER, supra note 59, § 17.13 at 451.
107. Id.
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percent of $90,000 up to the $500,000 limits of the policy (or ninety-
five percent of $90,000 which is $85,500, which would exceed the
$500,000 limits by $22,500; when combined with the $437,000 there-
fore the excess $22,500 will be uninsured). The insured would pay
the deductible of $20,000 plus five percent of $460,000 (or $23,000)
plus the excess $22,500, or a total of $65,500.
Assuming the same policy were in effect, if the insured success-
fully resisted the claim but incurred costs, charges, and expenses
of $90,000, the insurance company would pay ninety-five percent
of $70,000 (or $66,500), while the directors of X Corporation would
pay the deductible of $20,000 plus five -percent of the $70,000 in
excess of the retention (or $3,500) - a total of $23,500.
F. Notice Requirements and the Extended Discovery Clause
Under the terms of the policy, as a condition precedent to
indemnification, an insured or the corporation named in the decla-
rations must give to the insurance company both written notice of
any claim made as soon as practicable and such information and
cooperation as the insurer may reasonably require.""
Also included in the directors and officers policy is an extended
discovery clause. Basically, this clause provides that if the insurer
cancels or refuses to renew the policy, the insured has, upon pay-
ment of an additional premium in the amount of ten percent of the
three year premium, the right to an extension of coverage granted
by the policy. This extension provides coverage for claims which
may be made against the insured during the ninety day period
following the date of cancellation or nonrenewal, provided the
wrongful act upon which the claim is based was committed prior
to the date of cancellation or non-renewal. 09
Extended coverage may be affected by notice provisions. If
written notice is given to the insurer during the policy or extended
discovery period, claims made thereafter are treated as having been
made during the time coverage was afforded. For example, if dur-
ing the policy or extended discovery period the insured notifies the
insurer in writing of a third party's intent to hold the insured liable
for the results of a specified wrongful act committed or alleged to
have been committed by the insured while acting in his capacity
as director, any claim subsequently made by the third party for
108. Stewart, Smith Form VII(a).
109. Id. II.
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such wrongful act is treated as a claim made during a period in
which coverage was afforded."' Similarly, if the insured becomes
aware of any occurrence which may subsequently give rise to a
claim being made against the insured and gives written notice
thereof to the insurance company, any claim made after expira-
tion of the policy or extended discovery period but based on such
occurrence is treated as having been made during the policy or
extended discovery period."'
G. Cancellation
The cancellation clause provides that the policy may be can-
celled by the insureds or by the company named in the declaration,
at any time, by written notice or surrender of the policy. The
insurer may cancel the policy by delivering or mailing (by regis-
tered, certified, or other first-class mail) a thirty day written notice
of cancellation. What amount of the premium is returned is depen-
dent upon who terminates the relationship. If the insured cancels,
the insurer retains the short-rate proportion of the premium. If the
insurer cancels, on the other hand, it retains the pro rata portion
of the premium." 2
H. Subrogation
In the event that the insurer makes payment under the policy,
it is subrogated, to the extent of such payment to all the insureds'
rights of recovery. The insureds are under a duty to execute all
papers and perform all acts required to secure such rights - in-
cluding the execution of such documents needed to enable the in-
surer to bring suit in the name of the insureds." 3
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Corporations' Power to Purchase Insurance
The propriety of insurance for officers and directors has been
the subject of some controversy. It has been alleged that insurance
now covers acts for which the legislature has prohibited indemnifi-
cation, that is, the corporation is doing indirectly through insur-
110. Id. VII(b).
Ill. Id.
112. Id. VIII(c).
113. Id. VIII(d).
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ance that which it is prohibited from doing directly through indem-
nification."'
So long as the law imposes on directors duties of good faith and
due care, it should not permit them to evade those duties through
the device of insurance purchased by the corporation.'
Agreeing with this argument, the Minnesota Legislature
adopted a statute which specifically prohibits a corporation's pur-
chase of insurance covering management in areas where the corpo-
ration is not permitted to indemnify."' Underlying this argument
was the belief that accomplishing prohibited corporate indemnity
indirectly though insurance would abrogate the deterrent effect of
liability.17 It has also been argued that public policy would prevent
a corporation from reimbursing a director or officer through the
purchase of insurance when there exists a judgment in favor of the
corporation itself. The effect of such payment would be to nullify
the award."'
Furthermore, by the passage of the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934, Congress intended "to promote careful adherence to the
statutory requirements.""' The SEC, as part of a consistent ad-
ministrative policy, has indicated that any indemnification by the
corporation for Securities Act liability is against public policy.''
A condition to the acceleration of the registration statement is the
requirement that unless all claims for indemnification are waived,
the registrant must state it recognizes these arrangements are con-
trary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.12' In addition,
the registrant must include a concise description of any indemnifi-
cation provision in the registration statement and agree that unless
the matter is settled by controlling precedent, it will submit any
claim for indemnification for Securities Act liability (other than
114. W. KNEPPER, note 59 supra, § 17.02 at 432; See also Note, Public Policy and
Directors' Liability Insurance, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 716, 719 (1967); Bishop, 22 Bus.
LAWYER, supra note 1, at I11.
115. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1091 (1968).
116. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.095(7) (1969).
117. Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 11, at 717.
118. Bishop, 22 Bus. LAWYER, supra note 1, at 109-112; Note, 67 COLUM. L. REV.,
supra note 114, at 716-717.
119. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 29, 35 (1959).
120. W. KNEPPER, supra note 59, § 16.03 at 410.
121. Note (a), S.E.C. Rule 410, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460; Id.
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the payment of expenses of a successful defense) to a court for
adjudication of the issue and to be bound by the result."'
Insurance has been treated differently however. The SEC has
stated that insurance against liabilities arising under the 1933 Se-
curities Act, regardless of who bears the cost, is not against public
policy and no waivers or undertakings need to be supplied with
respect to such coverage.'2
Also of note are public policy arguments against insuring a
person for intentional wrongdoing or misconduct resulting in crim-
inal penalties. While insurance against liability resulting from such
conduct might promote the compensation of the insured victims,
the deterrent purpose of this type of liability has usually been
regarded as more important, and courts have generally held insur-
ance against this type of liability is inconsistent with public pol-
icy. 124
Thus any act which offends the public policy is uninsurable in
most cases, such as acts of wilful neglect, gross negligence, and
fraud, with certain exceptions. Likewise an act which calls for
fine and imprisonment is uninsurable insofar as the criminal
aspect of such acts is concerned.'2
However, insurance coverage for liability for one's intentional
or criminal conduct might be permissible in certain situations in
which the deterrent effect of potential liability is minimal and the
policy favoring the compensation of the victim is considerable.2
With respect to this question, one author stated:
122. Id.
123. W. KNEPPER, supra note 59, § 16.03 at 411 n. 34, citing SEC Releases No. 33-
4936, Dec. 9, 1968, 33 F.R. 18671, and No. 33-3791, Jan. 28, 1957, 22 F.R. 4075.
124. Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921) (Car-
dozo, J.); Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ala. 226, 146 So. 387 (1933); Haser
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 78 N.D. 893, 53 N.W.2d 508 (1952); Note, Liability Insurance for
Corporate Executives, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 648, 655 (1967).
125. Snow, Liability of Directors and Officers of Corporations, 17 DEFENSE L.J. 521,
541 (1968).
126. Wolff v. General Cas. Co. of America, 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961) (assault
and battery on sudden impulse); c.f. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191, 195
(6th Cir. 1943); Wheeler v. O'Connell, 297 Mass. 549, 9 N.E.2d 544 (1937); Hartford Accid.
& Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964) (compulsory auto insurance statute, inten-
tional wrongs: insurable); Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947)
(wanton and reckless conduct in auto accident: insurable). See generally Comment, Liability
Insurance and Assault and Battery: Coverage and Damage Problems, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
506 (1965); Note, Automobile Insurer's Liability for Damage Intentionally Caused, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1948).
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I have no difficulty with indemnification when, in the language
of the New York statute, the director, although guilty, "acted in
good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably believed to be in
the best interests of the corporation and, in criminal actions or
proceedings, in addition, had no reasonable cause to believe that
his conduct was unlawful." Indenmification of an agent in such
circumstances has long been regarded as permissible, if not man-
datory. (Citations omitted.)'"
Unlike fines or penalities, however, expenses associated with
the defense of a criminal suit should be insurable as a matter of
public policy. An analogy in support of this proposition may be
made by reference to tax case law. In Commissioner v. Tellier,1'1
the United States Supreme Court held that a taxpayer may deduct
as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense under Internal
Revenue Code section 162 the cost of unsuccessfully defending a
criminal prosecution for numerous fraudulent acts relating to se-
curities transactions. In answering the contention that this would
frustrate public policy, the Court noted "in an adversary system
of criminal justice, it is a basic of our public policy that a defendant
in a criminal case have counsel to represent him." '29 That public
policy which encourages criminal representation and vigorous de-
fense would seem to outweigh the minimal deterrent effect possibly
gained by forbidding insurance coverage of defense litigation costs.
While these arguments raise interesting questions, they are for
the most part academic today. The statutes enacted by numerous
state legislatures throughout the county seem to quash speculation
that a corporation cannot legally purchase directors' and officers'
liability insurance, simply by empowering corporations to do so.,"
In addition, the insurance companies offering D & 0 coverage
have refined policy language to specifically exclude coverage for
objectionable conduct. As previously noted, the Stewart, Smith
form excludes "fees or penalties imposed by law and matters which
may be deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which the
127. Bishop, 22 Bus. LAWYER, note I supra at 102 citing N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1974); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY 2D § 439, Comments g & h (1958); Simon
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affd mem.
267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). For similar statutes see CAL. CORP. CODE §
830(f) (West. Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.025(1) (1973); Wis. STAT. §
180.05(1) (1973).
128. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
129. 383 U.S. at 694.
130. See statutes cited in note 46 supra.
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policy is to be construed" in its definition of the term loss.' The
policy also excludes coverage for claims based on self-dealing,132
violations of section 16(b),133 and claims brought about by the
dishonesty of those insured (upon proof of active and deliberate
dishonesty committed with actual dishonest intent).1  Further-
more, the purchase of this type of insurance appears to be sanc-
tioned by both the IRS135 and the SEC.13 1 In addition the weight
of some public policy arguments is substantially diminished by
virtue of the retention and co-insurance features of the D & 0
policies now being offered.
One related question which remains in this area is whether the
term "penalties" includes punitive damages within its meaning and
therefore excludes them from coverage. Punitive damages have
been defined as:
damages over and above such sum as will compensate a person
for his actual loss. . .[permitted by law] in proper cases at the
discretion of the jury, not because the party injured is entitled to
them as a matter of right, but as punishment to the wrongdoer,
for the purpose of deterring him and others committing similar
violations of the law, from such wrongdoing in the future." 37
Such damages are only assessed on the basis of aggravated miscon-
duct exhibiting a particular malice, wantonness or outrageousness
on the part of the defendant. 38
Viewing punitive damages in this manner, one could legiti-
mately argue that insurance covering punitive damages is subject
to the same public policy considerations as those involved in the
question of insurance covering liability for intentional wrongdoing.
Indeed, notable case law and commentary on the subject seems to
indicate that insurance covering punitive damages would frustrate
the very purpose of their imposition and should therefore be con-
sidered contrary to public policy.'31 However, notwithstanding a
131. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
132. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
133. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
135. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
136. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
137. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 282, 149 So. 631, 632,
94 A.L.R. 376 (1933).
138. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971).
139. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (see p. 436
n. 11); Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 793 (Pa. Super. 1966); OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS
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dearth of case law, the majority of cases treating this issue have
held that there was coverage."' Basically, there are three justifica-
tions for this position. First, the policyholder is paying a premium
commensurate with the insurer's assumption of the added risk.
Second, the deterrent effect of punitive damages is generally con-
sidered to be weak when there is a simultaneous threat of criminal
liability. As one judge noted:
If criminal penalties provided by such statutes fail to deter the
wrongdoers, I seriously doubt that closing the market to insur-
ance coverage will do so. As a matter of fact, it is my judgment
that the opposite result will follow."'
Third, the insurance contract is a private contract between insured
and insurer. To hold that the insured, as a matter of public policy,
is not protected on his claim for punitive damages would have the
effect of partially voiding the contract, a proposition many courts
wish to avoid.
It may also be difficult to determine whether treble damages
(assessed for example in a section 4 Clayton Act anti-trust action)
are "punitive, 1 4 2 "compensatory," ' or both. 4 Perhaps the first
third should be considered compensatory and the other two-thirds
punitive for the purpose of determining insurability. It appears
that the treble damages concept occupies a place somewhere on
the thin line of demarcation between punitive and compensatory
damages affording no easy answer to the question of insurability.
VII. CONCLUSION
The liability of a director and/or officer in the performance of
his corporate duties is vulnerable to a host of complicated kinds
AND PROPERTY § 275c, at 560 (1961); PROSSER, supra note 138 at 13; Note, Liability
Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80 HARV. L. REv. 648 (1967).
140. E.g. Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Lanzenby v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
141. Lanzenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1, 4
(1964) (quoting Judge Gewin's separate concurring opinion in Northwestern National Cas-
ualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
142. Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 982 (1955).
143. Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?,
28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940).
144. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(dominant purpose is to provide added incentive to injured persons to litigate their claims
- in effect promoting both punitive and compensatory functions).
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of exposure, the consequences of which can be disastrous. Diverse
interests are involved. First, the shareholders desire a corporation,
profitably run by responsible persons, who should in turn answer
to the shareholders for the performance of their duties. The share-
holders want both to entice responsible persons to serve as direc-
tors and officers and at the same time hold these persons accounta-
ble when things go wrong. Secondly, corporate management re-
quires protection for the exercise of its business judgment in the
efficient running of the corporation and from unduly litigious
stockholders and third parties. Many responsible persons are justi-
fiably unwilling to risk personal liability to the extent the potential
exposure indicates. Lastly, the interest of the public demands ac-
countability in the form of damages for injuries suffered as a result
of the use of a corporate product or corporate activity.
Directors' and officers' liability has arisen to meet the needs of
these competing interests. Ideally, its protection induces responsi-
ble persons to continue serving as directors while its retention and
co-insurance features deter wrongful conduct. Policy limits and
exclusions also serve as reminders of the potential exposure for
objectable conduct. In addition, this insurance provides a fund to
which an injured shareholder or third party can look for damages
resulting from corporate misconduct, a fund which would other-
wise not be available in all probability.
It has been suggested that the present system of indemnifica-
tion and insurance be supplanted by a system whereby the measure
of liability of a corporate officer or director be in direct proportion
to what he gains from his position - the amount a prudent man
in similar circumstances would be willing to risk, rather than the
measure of loss proximately caused by his conduct.145 It has also
been suggested that a no-fault plan be substituted.' However, as
the fruition of these alternative suggestions does not appear to be
forthcoming, and as the types of exposure to which corporate
directors and officers may be subjected continue to expand, more
corporations are showing an interest in securing insurance.'47 While
the cost and strict qualification requirements have been ques-
145. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 895 at 916-918.
146. Id. at 919.
147. The 1974 Wyatt Survey at page 16 indicates an 18.3% increase in the purchase of
insurance by companies participating in both the 1973 and 1974 surveys not carrying this
insurance in 1973.
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tioned,148 and while the extent of coverage has at times been ambig-
uous as to what conduct is covered (due in part to the unsettled
theories of law upon which complicated causes of action are
brought and also in part to conduct which violates public policy
and therefore is not entitled to relief) insurers have made and
continue to make valiant efforts to provide effective insurance.
These efforts take form in constant refining of policy language,
many times producing policies tailored to the specific needs of a
particular business group."' In this manner D & 0 liability insur-
ance serves a valuable function in accommodating the interests of
corporate management, shareholders, and the public.
148. Is D & 0 Worth It?, Bus. INS. at 16 (March 15, 1971).
149. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
